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Abstract
This paper describes an observed phenomenon: The non-adoption of beneficial
practices in a project-based organization and the subsequent adoption of some
basic project management techniques which are then heralded as best-
practice. We examine two theories to explain this phenomenon, rational choice
theory and institutional theory. Neither of these, however, explains
satisfactorily what we observed.
The phenomenon occurred in a project-based organization that was contracted
to design, develop, and produce a major piece of military hardware. In the
early years of the project, the project team performed very poorly, and their
effort was marked by delivering prototypes that continually slipped behind
schedule by many years, overruns that also involved accompanying cost
escalation. It was only when an external auditor intervened that the team’s
performance was properly identified and the whole basis for the project
renegotiated. This renegotiation involved creating new requirements for
managing the project. The team’s performance subsequently improved slightly,
but eventually, again, stagnated. The organization did not identify or
implement further practices to improve the team’s performance. While the
organization exerted considerable effort to promote itself as performing best
practices, the team’s actual performance continually failed to meet
expectations.
This paper constructs a theory of complicity so as to explain the phenomenon
described above. The complicity occurred between the organization and its
major customer and between multiple levels within the organization. We turn
to insights from organizational learning research (specifically, the use of
defensive routines) to shed light on the phenomenon. The theory proposes that
practices and processes will remain within the defensive routines of the
organization where such complicity exists.
The level and rate of improvement of project performance by organizations has
been a concern for some time. This paper contributes to the discussion of this
concern and provides some illumination of one of causes hindering the team’s
performance, namely, that there is considerable complicity in project-based
organizations. Comparing this project with another case where many
best/accepted/promising practices have been adopted has yielded numerous
major insights. Complicity, as we describe here, was totally absent in the
comparator case; the organization was making significant progress in
developing practices. However, we found that complicity was temporarily
suspended when the minor changes were implemented in the case
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organization and evident in the periods of no improvement. Further
investigation into the conditions for the removal of complicity provided
evidence of complicity being removed by coherent policy deployment,
knowledge management and performance management.
This paper supports the use and utility of phenomenon-based research in the
development of the discipline of project management.
Introduction
This paper describes an observed phenomenon: the non-adoption of best /
accepted / promising practices in a particular project setting.
During data gathering for a project to determine the value of project
management,1 we visited organizations and conducted in-depth interviews. We
observed the phenomenon of non-adoption of best practice, even good
practice, and collected data that would help us understand why this was so. It
was observed in a case that a prime customer (major government department)
was accepting poor levels of performance from a major supplier. After many
years of accepting this poor performance, a crisis point was reached when
pressure from outside forced both parties to recognize the situation. This
threatened the very existence of the program. So, a series of actions was
undertaken to address the situation. Analysis of the case made little sense;
following the reforms, the supplier was being highly complacent about their
performance, and the customer was simply concerned with keeping the project
out of the press and ‘below-the-radar’. The costs to both the supplier and the
customer were considerable, yet they were both talking about the project as a
good news story. For this to happen, the firm would have had to adopt a much
greater range of accepted practices. Similarly, there was no sense of following
fashion here: indeed, there was considerable knowledge of such practices
elsewhere in the organization, and these were conspicuous by their absence.
However, they continued with a very low level of development of their project
management processes. Our case findings show that rather than making
positive choices to implement or test process innovations, individuals were able
to decide not to pursue particular approaches, regardless of the potential
(economic) benefits to the organization.
The phenomenon is certainly not unique but there are particular circumstances
with the case being investigated that highlighted its occurrence. Further, it is
not restricted to project environments; though it is worth investigating
whether there is something particular about project environments that allow
such behavior to flourish.
A challenge for management academics and practitioners is the non-adoption
of what organizations and individuals term as best, accepted, or even
promising practices (Leseure, Bauer, Birdi, Neely, & Denyer, 2004). Often
encouraged by governments in search of better economic performance (e.g.,
1 Project funded by PMI
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AIM initiative in the United Kingdom [UK]) or customers (usually large
organizations as part of their supplier development activities), organizations
will assimilate processes or approaches that are new to them. Past examples of
processes that organizations have adopted include Total Quality Management,
Business Process Reengineering, Lean, and Agile. These represent a
normalization of practices; one persistent criticism of the project management
literature is that it encourages such normalization. In actuality, it is clear that
there are many project management practices (now classified as accepted
practices) that could be used beneficially. This includes those practices that are
not being used by individuals or organizations. Such a lack of adoption and
application of existing project management knowledge remains a challenge for
such theories of normalization and, in many cases, represents a missed
opportunity for organizations attempting to continually improve their
performance.
There are two significant views about the adoption of particular practices
(Robertson, Swan, & Newell, 1996). The first comes from rational choice
theory, which proposes that managers are predominantly rational adopters
who make technically efficient choices, and hence, are driven by economic
rationality and institutional theory, which proposes that managers
predominantly respond to institutional mechanisms that may lead them to
choose practices that are technically inefficient and driven by normative
rationality. Such a normative rationality may include conformance to fads and
fashions (Abrahamson, 1996).
This paper considers this issue in the context of organizations and projects
where there is a low rate of adopting existing tools and techniques, and which,
because of this, leads to observably poor project performance. This issue is not
easily explained by the existing theory. So, this paper begins with a practical
question:
If a practice appears to yield benefits for an organization, why is it
not adopted?
By taking a critical perspective and exploring the power dynamics at work in
organizations, we lay the groundwork for an explanation of complicity theory, a
view which sees organizational members as actively and passively serving as
accomplices in acts of questionable value to the organization.
Methodology
Drawing from a recent study and data collection activity, we attempt to explain
common behavior on the part of otherwise seemingly reasonable individuals
who either fail to support or actively suppress the adoption of practices that
are commonly recognized as important to the success of projects. We start by
describing the study we draw from; then we explore other meta-theoretical
lenses that serve to clarify the motivation for this behavior.
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A grounded case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991) was appropriate for
advancing theory about social processes (Hallier & Forbes, 2004; Strauss &
Corbin, 2002). A case-based methodology was used for in-depth interviews
with 12 management and project-related staff, for further interviews with the
client organization, and for a survey of 21 managers connected to the project.
However, the methodology differs from mainstream research: The researchers
did not start with a particularly theoretical lens. The phenomenon observed
was not expected and therefore presents the opportunity for multi-
paradigmatic analysis to be undertaken (Schultz & Hatch, 1996).
The observed phenomenon
The project studied was to design, develop, and eventually, manufacture a new
piece of military hardware. From its outset, it was the subject to continual
slippage and cost escalation. Just two years into the project, the contractor
informed the client that it was unlikely to meet timescales; a revised in-service
date was agreed for March in the 10th year of the project. There followed a
series of renegotiations of the contract terms as both sides revised their
expectations for the project and introduced new approaches. By May in the 7th
year, for example, a new incremental approach to product delivery was
adopted which reflected a revised assessment of operations requirements. By
the end of the year, the contractor disclosed further slippage in both the
budget and the schedule. These slippages were related to the contractor’s
underestimation of the project’s technology risks, an underestimation which
placed the project team under severe cost-related pressures which required
further contract negotiations. The first full product test date was moved back
from the middle of the 7th year to late that year, then to the second half of the
8th year. The situation failed to improve, despite a plethora of advice resulting
from 11 separate reviews, which presented 255 issues to the management
team.
According to the project’s independent auditors:
Difficulties on (XXX) stem from ‘the design challenge being hugely
underestimated by industry, perhaps as a result of continuing to see the
project as if it were the adaptation of an existing [product], as it was
originally intended to be, when in fact 95% of the [product] is new.
Against the background of the fixed price contract, the consequent cost
pressure and financial losses provided little incentive on (the contractor)
to deliver. These difficulties were compounded by a weak programme
management culture which lacked transparency, neglected or overrode
project control systems and disciplines, and produced forecasts that
lacked depth and reality. The [client’s] oversight and influence was also
restricted by the limited access and insight provided by the fixed price
contract
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This threw the project into complete crisis, and in year 8, the two parties
agreed, in effect, to create a new agreement which accepted the slippage,
which by then, totaled 71 months. They agreed to share the costs between the
two parties. Then new, revised milestones were introduced: First complete
test, June of year 9; award of manufacturing contract, late year 10; in-service
date, year 13.
Evidence of practices within the organization prior to year 7 included the
following comment from one of the interviewees that:
The client was worried about performance. The company was worried
about cost. No-one worried about schedule.
Given the continuing delays, this was to key to the idea that there was a kind
of collusion here, that each party trying to protect their own interests, while
missing one of the major issues that was central to the overall success of the
project.
Similarly, much mention was made of the prevailing technical culture, where
the focus was on achieving technical excellence rather than meeting the needs
of a business case. For instance, another interviewee commented:
We had basic [project management] mechanisms but the ‘culture’ was
not there. I was fairly typical of managers who were not concerned with
business case – just did numbers to save getting b~@:?>< by the
boss… We used to aim to surpass customers’ expectations – regardless
of whether he wanted the features and the gold-plating.
This culminated in the organization being described as:
It was a terrible place to work – there was fear, the project was a dead-
duck and morale was very low.
And another:
The programme was out of control—people weren’t being true to each
other about what could be achieved—either in our own organisation or
the customer’s organisation. We both wanted to understand that—that
was as much of a driver as the performance itself.
The organization responded by slowing progress further by initiating no fewer
than 11 separate audits and reviews of the project which required over 170
high-level actions for management.
As a result of the restructuring of the contract, the development, manufacture,
and service contracts were separated out and project reforms were introduced.
These project reforms included:
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 Allowing the client organization fuller access to industry schedule, cost,
and programmed data; allowing the co-location of staff at both the
manufacturing and operational bases.
 The introduction of anchor milestones—targets that when achieved
provide assurance that the in-service date or other contractual obligation
will be met—to incentivize reform of project control systems.
 A joint risk register was introduced.
 Three-point estimates would be jointly calculated to measure confidence
levels in the time and cost estimates for various elements of the
program.
 Financial data on the development and production activities would be
reviewed on a monthly basis, at a joint meeting between the contractor
and the client.
 Earned value management (EVM) would be used to measure and
communicate progress and achievement against costs and provide
confidence in the quality of anchor milestone elements. The focus would
be on measuring outcomes achieved rather than effort expended.
These reforms were, according to company documentation, ‘embedded in a
robust and open partnering approach that raises access, information,
communication and behaviors with a greater emphasis on delivery, cost
minimization and schedule adherence.’ One manager stated the benefits of this
as:
We now have control and predictability and can understand cause and
effect in the schedule. The customer particularly likes that. We used to
be cheesed off about his requirements constantly changing. It [the new
approach] reduces flexibility but now easier as you can show the effects
of particular changes. Plan becomes a heuristic tool as there are knock-
on effects.
In addition, the organization put in place a behavioral program—one aiming to
legitimize and professionalize project management—as well as a leadership
development program and partnering development program.
However, the changes were relatively straightforward. One manager
commented:
Our objective was very simple—we needed conformance to a fairly basic
level of proceduralisation.
Within the contractor company, the reform program is held up as a great
success. The project is now seen as exemplifying good or best practice
throughout the parent organization. A prime outcome of the reforms is that the
program is no longer under threat of closure. The company retained the
business and the project now has fallen below the client’s radar. The
relationship with the customer is much better. Planning disciplines have been
implemented. People working on the project appear motivated and confident in
both the product and the new processes.
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However, below the surface, there is very little critique of what has been
achieved in comparison to external benchmarks.
During our research, we found very low levels of knowledge and certification in
the firm. Management qualifications were not recognized: There was only one
MBA, although the contractor intended to change this. The customer was
similarly unknowledgeable. In terms of project management maturity, they
have moved from chaotic to the use of some basic processes. More surprising,
there is no desire or requirement for ongoing improvement:
I don’t believe we’ll move the bar much beyond where it has gone
already.
We won’t spend any more money on comparing a good programme with
a bad programme – we’ll send them out into the hinterland as disciples
and bring in more junior people to train up. (Project Director).
Despite the reforms, the project showed continued slippage in schedule and
cost performance, albeit at a slower rate than before.
The complicity that was stagnating performance was well established in the
organization again. Data from the 21 project managers surveyed showed that:
 Fifteen of the 21 agreed, and 1 strongly agreed, with the statement that
they were well trained (5 neutral).
 Fourteen of the 21 agreed, and 2 strongly agreed, with the statement
that they had suitable education to fulfill their jobs (5 neutral).
 Three strongly agreed, and 12 agreed, that management provides
advanced development and training programs for organizational
members.
This is despite the fact that there was not a single recognized qualification
among the 180 project office staff. We interpret this difference as a form of
collusion. Further, this was reflected in the views of the organizational project
management capability:
 Fourteen of the 21 agreed, and 2 strongly agreed, with the statement
that the organization is viewed as having a very strong management
capability (3 neutral and 2 disagreed).
 Eleven agreed, and 7 strongly agreed, that the organization had very
high project management standards.
 Fifteen agreed, and 2 strongly agreed, that this organization has superior
project management practices.
The benchmark here was taken as knowledge of the bodies of knowledge
(APM/PMI). Not one of the interviewees demonstrated such knowledge. The
last statement provides another interesting contrast with the performance that
the project was again demonstrating. On the subject of performance:
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 Only 5 agreed that the project management practices of the organization
consistently exceed expectations (15 neutral and 2 disagreed).
The self delusion is evidenced by:
 Eight agreed, and 2 strongly agreed, with the statement that ‘Projects in
this organization are more successful than in other organizations I know’
(9 neutral and 2 disagree).
 Twelve agreed, and 5 strongly agreed, that the organization delivered
high quality products and services.
 Twelve agreed, and 2 strongly agreed, that projects were successfully
delivered.
 Twelve agreed (5 neutral, 4 disagreed) that projects managed by the
organization consistently deliver on their objectives.
However, when broken down, we see that this was mostly in terms of technical
specifications:
 Two strongly agreed and 11 agreed that projects achieved their technical
objectives.
Whereas:
 Only 5 agreed that they met their schedule objectives (10 disagreed and
1 strongly disagreed).
 Nine disagreed, and 1 strongly disagreed, that they met budget
objectives.
In relation to their opinion of the clients’ view of projects:
 Eleven agreed, and 10 were neutral, in relation to the statement: Clients
are consistently satisfied by the process by which projects are managed.
While the question of who is the client can here be argued, the client
themselves had no reason to be satisfied with a renegotiated and very late
project that was continuing to slip, albeit at a slower rate than before.
Overall, what we witnessed was a complicity between the client and the
contractor (just stay out of the press), propped up by complicity within the
contracting organization (it is a good news story), and complicity in the project
team (we are well qualified, knowledgeable, and doing well). The result is that
poor processes and poor performance were allowed to continue with no
obvious vector for improvement.
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Can the theory help explain this?
There are several theoretical approaches which might explain this observed
phenomenon, including innovation diffusion theory, institutional theory, the
fads and fashions literature, rational choice theory, and organizational
learning.
Innovation diffusion theory
Diffusion theory concerns the role adopted by different actors: early adopters
or laggards (Rogers, 1983). The first phase of the diffusion of innovative
practice sees it adopted by a relatively few innovators, the early adopters.
Once the efficacy of the practice is demonstrated by these early adopters, it is
taken up by other organizations, and so it diffuses more generally over time,
until it becomes standard practice. What we have observed above does not
seem to fit easily with this, in that it is more about many years in avoiding the
use of good practices that had already diffused widely into other project
settings. In order for new practices to be adopted, these must first be found in
some kind of search activity. It appears that there was little attempt to find a
better practice until the major crisis in year 7, where the threat of program
closure forced the contractor to seek alternatives. Once these were
implemented, however, there was no further change. Perhaps the case
organization could simply be viewed as laggards, but this is not necessarily
helpful in explaining the full range of behaviors.
Institutional theory would suggest that organizations in the same industry
exhibit isomorphism: They will adopt similar working practices (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983). On the one hand, diffusing practices seen as best practice takes
place encouraged by the legitimacy argument. The introduction of earned
value (EV) by the project organization was legitimized by the widespread and
successful use of the technique in the company’s United States (US) business.
Furthermore, a new manager was appointed to oversee the changes. This
individual had previously worked in the US business. On the other hand, the
benefits achieved by the adoption of successful practice may inhibit the
adoption of superior practices in the future (Arthur, 1989). In this case, the
non-adoption of superior practice in the future is not so much a result of the
successful adoption of the EV technique but more a deliberate strategy not to
go beyond what has already been achieved.
At the level of the organization, some practices become institutionalized as
rules (i.e., the way we do things around here). Such practices become
embedded and are very resistant to change (Oliver, 1992). It appears that the
new good practice has become institutionalized as a rule in the organization,
and hence, it will be hard to change it in the future.
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Rational choice
Rational choice approaches to the adoption of new practices and their impact
on performance include the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March,
1963; March & Simon, 1967) and evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter,
1982). These suggest that the primary driver for organizational innovations is
the identification of performance gaps. When a firm’s actual performance drops
below its desired performance level, its performance is determined either by
past performance and internal targets (Lant & Mezias, 1992) or by comparison
to an external reference group (Massini, Lewin, & Greve, 2005). This
performance gap will lead managers to search for new practices to improve
performance. Once the new practice has been adopted and put into use,
managers will compare before-and-after performance to determine whether it
should be retained or discarded. Thus, rational choice presents the
identification, selection, evaluation, and retention or discarding of management
practices as relatively straightforward for managers, who should thus be
viewed as rational actors searching for new practices to maintain or improve
organizational performance.
This clearly has not happened, except when forced in a one-step change. The
project was performing poorly for many years before any change was
implemented. (Problems were identified beginning in year3 through to the final
melt-down in year 7.) Furthermore, despite the opportunity for further
improvement, no improvements were realized.
The institutional approach
An alternate perspective to rational choice is the institutional approach, which
derives from sociology, and shifts the main focus of attention from rational
choice and technical efficiency to pressures from the organization’s external
environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The institutional approach views all
economic activity as embedded in social contexts. While firms may aspire to
rational solutions to performance gaps, because of the uncertainty involved in
competing practices and performance outcomes, or the alternative practices
that might plausibly achieve the same outcomes, firms may be uncertain about
how to achieve rational solutions. Managers instead appear as rational and
progressive, according to norms of rationality (March & Olsen, 1976), they will
tend to adopt institutionalized organizational practices, such as those taken-
for-granted as the most appropriate means of improving performance, and
hence perceive these as legitimate by key institutional actors (Abrahamson,
1996).
From an institutional perspective, the explanations accompanying the adoption
of a new practice become important because explaining how the practice helps
managers achieve the desired performance outcomes legitimizes the practice
(Green, 2004). It is also essential to constructing certain practices as taken-
for-granted (Green, 2004; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Hence, a focus on
managerial discourse often accompanies an institutional analysis of diffusion
and adoption of management innovations. The management fashion
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perspective (Abrahamson, 1991; Abrahamson, 1996; Abrahamson & Fairchild,
1999; Strang & Macy, 2001; Strang & Still, 2004) focuses particularly on the
role of rhetoric and social networks in the diffusion of new practices, and the
presence of bandwagons, or the number of adopters (Abrahamson &
Rosenkopf, 1997). Managers must, therefore, heed key institutional actors,
including consulting firms, management gurus, business mass-media
publications, and business schools, each who provide important sources of
information for managers about what other firms are doing.
Institutional theory further specifies that the diffusion and adoption of
management practices will be influenced by mimetic, coercive, and normative
pressures from the external environment (Scott, 2001) to adopt certain
practices. Mimetic pressures are pressures for firms to imitate the practices of
other, usually successful, firms; coercive pressures are pressures to avoid
sanctions from regulatory agencies and other institutional actors; normative
pressures are pressures to conform to perceived professional norms.
Institutional actors are thus important in driving the diffusion and adoption of
management practices (Paauwe & Boselie, 2005) and there are strong
sanctions associated with failing to adopt certain practices (Nelson, Peterhansl,
& Sampat, 2004). However, diffusion and adoption is not only a social process,
since technical, economic, and socio-psychological forces jointly shape the
demand for new practices, and diffusion and adoption of practice is ultimately
driven by the need to respond to organizational performance gaps.
In this case, the focus of the theory is on adoption of practices, rather than
explaining non-adoption as we have seen here. For instance, while there has
clearly been a project management bandwagon, the case organization has
taken conscious decisions to ignore it.
The organizational learning approach
Another perspective is provided by the organizational learning literature which
accepts that organizational issues create barriers to learning and improvement.
We would suggest that this perspective is the most useful to help us
understand the case presented above. In particular we draw on the concept of
defensive routines (Argyris, 1993) to explain the non-adoption of promising
practices from elsewhere. Organizational defensive routines exist in both
private and governmental organizations, but few studies have been undertaken
about how to overcome these (Argyris, 1993, p.242). Those few that do offer
advice seem to suggest either bypassing the defensive routines and covering
up the bypass or else acting in ways that actually strengthen the routines
rather than get rid of them.
An organizational defensive routine is any policy or action that inhibits
individuals, groups, inter-groups or organisations from experiencing
embarrassment or threat and at the same time prevents the actors from
identifying the causes of embarrassment or threat. Organizational
defensive routines are anti-learning and over-protective. (Argyris,
1993, p. 15)
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The immediate effect of such policies, practices, and behaviors is to inhibit the
detection and correction of error. A second-order effect is to inhibit problem
solving and decision making. The third order effect is less effective
organizational performance.
The case above can be seen as a clear example of this. Despite the
embarrassment of continually being over budget and late on schedule, the
situation was allowed to continue for many years because the organization
refused to experience the embarrassment. The refusal to become embarrassed
by the poor performance led both sides to ignore the signals. There was
complicity in this. This refusal to accept the obvious inhibited problem solving
and decision making. Better to turn a blind eye than to see the problem
because then something would have to be done about it. Better not to hear the
news that things were going badly. Managers commented:
The Company didn’t ask questions because it didn’t want the answers.
In a programme that on day 1 was going to fail, the culture was ‘don’t
want to hear bad news.’
In a study of defensive routines in government, Argyris (1993) observed that
“neither the official policies nor the administrator’s espoused values was there
encouragement to deceive, to manipulate, or to distort information.
Nevertheless, the actions were robust; they appeared in spite of (and even
because of) their deviancy from ideas in good currency on how to administer
governmental agencies” (p. 19).
In a similar way, neither the policies nor the espoused values of the employees
and managers in the company we studied encouraged them to actively
deceive, manipulate, or distort information. They simply ignored the
information coming from external assessment (e.g., the auditor’s reports).
Their denial was robust.
According to Argyris (1993), organizational defensive routines are caused by a
circular, self-reinforcing process in which individuals’ theories in use produce
individual strategies of bypass and cover-up, which reinforce the individuals’
theories in use. Thus the explanation for organizational defensive routines is
both individual and organizational. This means that it is necessary to change
both organizational and individual routines to achieve sustained change of
behavior. The reform programs that the company undertook addressed this by
creating a standardized approach to project management in the program so
that all individuals operated in the same way and to the same norms. Our
interviews confirmed this; individuals were pleased to adopt the new practices,
as they could see benefit from these and their theories in use became closer to
the espoused theories in the new situation.
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Towards a theory of complicity
We found that when the behavior exhibited was not explained by innovation
diffusion theory, the outcome was counter-rational; and it was not following
the path that a fad and fashion would lead us to expect. We obtained a partial
explanation for this by examining the construction and usage of defensive
routines as barriers to organizational learning. This partial explanation is not
satisfactory because it does not address their causes. Therefore, for both
theoretical and practical purposes, some further explanation is required.
The data provides evidence of complicity in the performance and rate of
change at multiple levels: Between the client and the contracting organization,
between the organization and the project, and within the project hierarchy.
This complicity is causal to the failure to remove defensive routines. During the
transition phase in 2003, complicity was removed at all levels, and process
improvement took place. Complicity was then re-established and no further
changes were made. The proposition we derive is this:
Processes and practices will remain within the defensive routines of the
organisation where there is complicity for them to do so.
Further, we posit that:
Complicity is an active state achieved where the parties to the complicity
collude to allow it to be so.
This is evidenced by the positive statements supporting no change that were
made during each of the complicity states (pre- and post-2003).
With these propositions in mind, it is appropriate to see if they may have a
wider currency. For instance, there is concern about the level of improvements
that are being achieved in project performance. The Standish Group’s Chaos
reports chronicle the outcome of IT projects (PMI, 2003; Standish Group
International Inc., 2004). The project outcomes are also measured by their
completion on time, budget, and quality. The TechRepublic Study by the
Gartner Group paints a similar picture. In 2000, 1275 North American IT
specialists were asked about the outcome of internal IT projects in terms of
achieving time, cost, and quality objectives. The picture is consistently
inconsistent: There are some organizations making great progress with
improving process and performance, but the data from these studies does
suggest that there are a considerable number who are making little progress.
We speculate that complicity provides a possible root cause for such a
situation, and that further research would demonstrate if this was in fact the
case.
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Is there something particular about project settings that
encourages this behavior?
As suggested above, the complicity demonstrated in this case may not be an
isolated occurrence. Similar to Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatters (2003)
studies of mega projects in transportation, key stakeholders ranging from
owner organizations, government officials, and key contractors cooperated to
use less than best practice project procedures.
So is there something about project settings that encourages this kind of
behavior? Again, the literature is not terribly helpful on this. The level of
uncertainty faced by the organization is recognized as playing an important
influence in best practice diffusion. O’Neill, Pouder, and Buchholtz (1998)
suggest that organizations that operate in highly uncertain environments have
to be very flexible and able to adapt and change their practices rapidly to meet
the demands of the environmental changes. This would tend to favor rapid
adoption of best practice, especially if firm survival depends on being at the
forefront. In times of severe crisis, however, even these firms tend to
backtrack and rely on tried-and-tested methods, thus reducing flexibility and
centralizing authority (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). On the other hand
organizations operating in highly stable environments may not see the need to
change at all.
According to this view then project-based organizations, which typically work
in an unstable environment, would tend to be flexible and open to rapid
adoption of new practices. Our case shows the opposite. Here is a project-
based organization (PBO) with high levels of uncertainty in the product it is
producing and which is inherently conservative in its adoption of new practices.
Furthermore, it is only when it goes into a deep crisis that it responds by
introducing a change of approach and the introduction of a limited range of
new tools and methods.
According to Levy (2007), stability is all-important, even at the expense of
innovation and change. Perhaps, in the project environment, people seek
stability, not from the organization (inherently unstable, temporary, and
shifting as project progresses), the product (outcome being uncertain), but in
the process, in the way they work. Tolerance of uncertainty thus limits
behavior. This behavior is exhibited in defensive routines. Collusion is not a
random occurrence, it is led.
The collusion often wears the mask of its opposite. The collusion seeks calm
waters and seeks, either consciously or unconsciously, to create safety and
security through non-challenge and superficial tolerance. The result:
mediocrity (Levy, 2007).
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This mask promotes excellence: The limited changes are held up as an
amazing transformation in the corporation. It is espoused by all but the most
senior people, and in the case above, including them. It is the organization’s
culture that presents the biggest barrier to learning. The default position is of
non-change in these organizations. Even when they are forced to change by
some crisis, they quickly shift back to type and rather than becoming a
changed organization that is open to learning (double-loop learning), they
quickly adopt a new defensive routine.
Project-based organizations may therefore be more susceptible to complicity.
However, it is clear that projects are not destined to live in this world of non-
adoption, as the following case will illustrate.
Contrast Case: T5
The new Terminal 5 building (T5) at London’s Heathrow Airport stands out as
an example of rapid application of innovative approaches and processes. BAA,
the client and owner of Heathrow Airport, implemented a strategic program of
capability building to improve the management of its projects, and in
particular, the management of T5, its biggest project ever. They learned from
previous projects, individuals, and organizations that contributed to the
innovative approach used to manage the T5 project. Between 2000 and 2002,
BAA conducted in-depth analysis of every major UK construction project (over
£1billion) in the previous ten years and on every international airport that had
been opened in the previous ten years. This research showed that none of
them had been delivered on-time and within-budget, or to the quality
standards expected. They realized the only way to deliver T5 was to change
the rules of the game by creating a set of behaviors that allowed people to
come up with innovative solutions to problems. Not only did BAA learn
internally from its past projects, it also learned externally from other airport
projects, from other sectors, and from leading practice in supply chain
management (SCM) and project management (Brady, Davies, Gann, & Rush,
2006).
Further investigation of the approach demonstrates that there were a number
of key elements present here that prevented the negative behavior of
complicity that was evident in the main case. These were elements include the
following:
1. Clear Policy Deployment: The objective at the outset of the project
included ‘setting a new standard for project delivery’ and ‘no surprises
for BAA shareholders.’ (www.baa.com) This provided a clear statement
for how resources would be allocated in support of the new standard.
The behavioral contract that was put in place with contractors required
this to be operationalized.
2. Knowledge Management: Learning internally from previous projects, as
well as carefully selecting appropriate practices from other industries,
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was evident. Ongoing learning within the project was evident too, with
practices such as Last Planner being used.
3. Performance Management: As stated by rational choice theory, the
application of new approaches requires that there is some means to
identify whether the performance is improved by any new approach. This
was evident in the T5 case.
The three conditions to remove the complicity also apply in the transition
phase of the main case: There was a clear policy for the change, deployed
throughout the project organization. There was appropriate knowledge brought
in and process measures of performance installed. However, when these were
removed, the complicity was re-established.
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that the non-adoption of promising or good
practice is supported by the existence of defensive routines. The attempts
using institutional and rational choice theories to explain the phenomenon were
only limited in their success. As a result, we have proposed a theory of
complicity, summarized in the proposition that practices and processes will
remain within the defensive routines of the organization where such complicity
exists. The complicity we describe is a multi-level collusion that accepts the
status quo.
Project environments may be particularly susceptible to such collusion, and
this may contribute to understanding why the performance of organizations in
project terms is so variable, and headline rates of performance demonstrate
only limited improvements. Contrary to the literature, project environments
which are full of uncertainty do not appear to be the locus of rapid adoption of
new practice. We further suggest that this is due in part to the desire for
stability in an uncertain environment. Where the technology is uncertain,
where the relationships with stakeholders are uncertain, then project members
seek stability in the processes they use. There is a built-in desire not to rock
the boat. Even when crises arise which force a change, the change in
underlying behavior is only temporary and they snap back into their old ways
of working. New defensive routines emerge to replace the old ones. It takes an
enormous effort to make sustainable changes in this environment. Much
further research is required before we can try to generalize these findings.
However, the T5 project appears to offer hope that such sustainable change in
behavior may be possible, given the right environment.
While there is a general acceptance that increasing an organization’s project
management maturity is desirable, there are clearly some conditions that lead
to this. First, there is the recognition of better and improved ways and the
benefits that they would bring to the project organization. With the low level of
knowledge that was demonstrated in the case organization, there is limited
identification of areas for improvement. Second, even if these had been
identified, there was no policy to drive the improvement through; in fact, the
opposite was demonstrated. Last, it is clear that there was no performance
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management system in place that would detect if the changes had indeed been
successful. The result was that there was nothing to oppose the root cause of
the defensive routines that had built up in the organization, and nothing to
prevent complicity from being re-established.
We started from a case-based method which yielded a particular phenomenon
which was unexpected. The application of various theoretical lenses provided
only limited explanation of the phenomenon. Starting the research without a
pre-determined theoretical stance allowed the exploration of the phenomenon
in ways that would not have otherwise been possible. This appears to be useful
in contributing to the methodological development of the project management
discipline.
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